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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the standard will probably enjoy a long and productive career in our
country. But realizing the enhancement of the economy by business' re-
liance and action on anticipated gains, the courts should continue to
liberalize the requirements for satisfying the standard. This may be
accomplished without invading the principles involved by an increased
reliance on available economic data and a more sympathetic attitude
towards efforts for progress and achievement.
RICHMOND BERNHARDT, JR.
Evidence-The Dead Man's Statute-Personal Transaction
In the recent case of Hardison v. Gregory' the North Carolina
Supreme Court once again had before it the problem of deciding whether
a particular fact situation constituted a "personal transaction or com-
munication" between an interested witness and a deceased person under
N. C. G. S. § 8-51, commonly referred to as "the dead man's statute."'2
It should be noted that the statute does not disqualify all witnesses
or all testimony. A very good analysis of the statute was made by Jus-
tice Ervin in the case of Peek v. Shook3 as follows:
"This statute does not render the testimony of a witness in-
competent unless these four questions require an affirmative
answer:
"1. Is the witness (a) a party to the action, or (b) a person
interested in the event of the action,4 or (c) a person from,
through or under whom such a party or interested person derives
his interest or title?
1242 N. C. 324, 82 S. E. 2d 96 (1955). See Case Law Survey, 34 N. C. L.
REv. 53 (1955).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51. "Upon the trial of an action, or the hearing upon
the merits of a special proceeding, a party or a person interested in the event,
or a person from, through or under whom such a party or interested person de-
rives his interest or title, by assignment or otherwise, shall not be examined as a
witness in his own behalf or person, or the committee of a lunatic, or the person
deriving his title or interest from, through or under a deceased person or lunatic,
by assignment or otherwise, concerning a personal transaction or communication
between the witness and the deceased person or lunatic; except where the executor,
administrator, survivor, committee or person deriving title or interest is examined
in his own behalf, or the testimony of the lunatic or deceased person is given in
evidence concerning the same transaction or communication."
Exclusionary statutes of this type are in effect in all but three states: Con-
necticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. In New Mexico, Oregon and Vir-
ginia, the interested party may testify, but his testimony uncorroborated is in-
sufficient to support a recovery. 2 WIGMORE, EViDENcE § 578 (3rd ed. 1940).
233 N. C. 259, 63 S. E. 2d 542 (1951). See also: Bunn v. Todd, 107 N. C.
266, 11 S. E. 1043 (1890) and STANSBURY, EVIDENCE § 66 (1946).
' "The interest which determines the competency of a witness under the statute
is a present direct pecuniary interest." Sanderson v. Paul, 235 N. C. 56, 61, 69
S. E. 2d 156, 160 (1952). See also: Price v. Askins; 212 N. C. 583, 194 S. E. 284
(1937) ; Burton v. Styers, 210 N. C. 230, 186 S. E. 248 (1936) ; In re Gorham, 177
N. C. 271, 98, S. E. 717 (1919).
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"2. Is the witness testifying (a) in his own behalf or interest,
or (b) in behalf of the party succeeding to his title or interest?
"3. Is the witness testifying against (a) the personal repre-
sentative of a deceased person, or (b) the committee of a lunatic,
or (c) a person deriving his title or interest from, through or
under a deceased person or lunatic?
"4. Does the testimony of the witness concern a personal
transaction or communication between the witness and the de-
ceased person or lunatic?
"Even in the instances where these four things occur, the
testimony of the witness is nevertheless admissible under the ex-
ception specified in the statute itself if the personal representative
of the deceased person, or the committee of the lunatic, or the
person deriving his title or interest from, through, or under the
deceased person or lunatic is examined on his own behalf, or the
testimony of the deceased person or lunatic is given in evidence
concerning the same transaction or communication." 5
The basic reason for the rules laid down by the statute seems to be
to prevent fraud, the idea being that since the deceased person is no
longer able to testify as to what happened or what was said, it would
be easy for the living party to give false testimony without fear of con-
tradiction. "Death having closed the mouth of the deceased, the law
closed the mouth of the other except only where the personal representa-
tive of the deceased opens up the matter by testifying himself or
putting in the testimony of the deceased." 6
It has been stated that "courts are not disposed to extend the dis-
qualification of a witness under the statute to those not included in its
express terms."17 Testimony as to any matter other than a transaction
or communication with the deceased is not prohibited by the statute ;' nor
is testimony as to transactions or communications with third persons
prohibited even though they may involve or throw light upon transac-
tions with deceased persons since the third persons, being disinterested,
can be called to contradict any misstatement. ° Testimony of an inter-
ested witness on behalf or in favor of the deceased person is not pro-
1233 N. C. at 261, 63 S. E. 2d at 543.
'Sutton v. Wells, 175 N. C. 1, 4, 94 S. E. 688, 689 (1917). See also: Hall
v. Holloman, 136 N. C. 35, 48 S. E. 516 (1904) ; McCanless v. Reynolds, 74 N. C.
301 (1875).
Sanderson v. Paul, 235 N. C. 56, 59, 69 S. E. 2d 156, 158 (1952); Hardison v.
Gregory, 242 N. C. 324, 327, 88 S. E. 2d 96, 98 (1955).
' In re the Will of Bowling, 150 N. C. 507, 64 S. E. 368 (1909) ; Whitesides
v. Green, 64 N. C. 307 (1870).
' Watts v Warren, 108 N. C. 514, 13 S. E. 232 (1890); Bunn v. Todd, 107
N. C. 266, 11 S. E. 1043 (1890) ; Cary v. Cary, 104 N. C. 175, 10 S. E. 156 (1889).
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hibited;10 nor does G. S. § 8-51 prevent an interested party who is
merely an observer from testifying as to acts of the deceased-i.e., as
to independent facts based upon independent knowledge, not derived
from any personal transaction or communication with the deceased.,-
In the principal case the plaintiff, in an action for criminal conversa-
tion and alienation of affections dgainst the co-administrators of the
deceased, was allowed to testify, over the objections of the defendants,
that he had: (1) walked into his own house at night and found the
deceased standing in his living room close to the door of the bedroom
in which his wife was dressing; (2) seen the deceased and his wife leave
a cabin owned by the deceased and drive off in the deceased's Cadillac
car; (3) looked through the window of deceased's office and seen the
deceased hugging and kissing his wife; and (4) seen the deceased and
his wife come out of a cabin and get into deceased's Cadillac, chased
them, knocked out the windows of the car with a hatchet, and struck
the deceased with the hatchet.
The court held that the testimony relating to what the witness had
seen the deceased do was competent "because he was testifying to inde-
pendent facts based upon independent knowledge, not derived from any
personal transaction or communication with the deceased."1 2 This much
of the holding is certainly in accord with previous decisions in North
Carolina' 3 and in other jurisdictions.' 4 However, the court disagreed as
to the admissibility of the testimony in regard to the action of the plain-
tiff in breaking the windows of the car and hitting the deceased in the
face with a hatchet. The majority held that this was admissible as testi-
mony of independent acts, while the concurring judges15 considered this
as testimony concerning a "personal transaction" between the plaintiff
and the deceased.
Exactly what may or may not constitute a "personal transaction"
under any given set of facts is often hard to determine. The courts have
been reluctant to formulate any specific criteria which could be followed
consistently and apparently have ben satisfied to deal with each situation
as the problem arose. However, the court has said, "we think a fair test
'0 Reece v. Woods, 180 N. C. 631, 105 S. E. 337 (1920) ; Seals v. Seals, 165
N. C. 409, 81 S. E. 613 (1914); McFarland v. Dept. of Labor and Industries,
188 Wash. 357, 62 P. 2d 714 (1936).
" Wilder v. Medlin, 215 N. C. 542, 2 S. E. 2d 549 (1939) ; Worth v. Wrenn,
144 N. C. 656, 57 S. E. 388 (1907); Costen v. McDowell, 107 N. C. 546, 12 S. E.
432 (1889) ; McCall v. Wilson, 101 N. C. 598, 8 S. E. 225 (1888).
12 242 N. C. at 329, 88 S. E. 2d at 99.
3 See note 11 supra.
1" Stiff v. Cobb, 126 Ala. 381, 28 So. 402 (1900) ; First Nat. Bank v. Warner,
17 N. D. 76, 114 N. W. 1085 (1908) ; Hanson v. Fiesler, 49 S. D. 442, 207 N. W.
449 (1926).
" Three judges concurred in the result because the same facts were testified
to by a witness for the defendants.
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in undertaking to ascertain what is a 'personal transaction or communi-
cation' with the deceased about which the other party to it cannot testify
is to inquire whether, in case the witness testify falsely as to what
transpired between them, the deceased, if living, could contradict it of
his own knowledge" ;16 and, "the transactions contemplated by the statute
and concerning which a party to an action is prohibited from being
examined on his own behalf against the administrator of the deceased
person are such transactions as are essential and material links in the
chain establishing liability against the estate of such deceased person."'17
Specifically, courts have held that testimony concerning "personal
transactions" includes testimony as to the following: money due on
contract,18 the existence of a partnership,19 marriage,20 delivery of writ-
ten instruments or other objects, 21 and performance of personal serv-
ices.22 Also, it has been held that the statute applies to actions in tort
as well as on contract.23  Among the tort situations which have been
included within the statute as "personal transactions" are: accidents in-
volving automobiles, 24 malpractice, 25 and assault.
26
1 White v. Evans, 188 N. C. 212, 213, 124 S. E. 194, 194 (1924). See also:
Yuritch v. Yuritch, 139 N. J. Eq. 439, 51 A. 2d 901 (1947) ; Tallman v. First Nat.
Bank of Nev., 66 Nev. 248, 208 P. 2d 302 (1950) ; Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N. C 396,
42 S. E. 2d 468 (1948); Sherrill v. Wilhelm, 182 N. C. 673, 110 S. E. 95 (1921);
In re Wind's Estate, 27 Wash. 2d 421, 178 P. 2d 731 (1947).
" Davis v. Pearson, 220 N. C. 163, 165, 16 S. E. 2d 655, 656 (1941). See also:
Boyd v. Williams, 207 N. C. 30, 175 S. E. 832 (1934).V8 George v. McManus, 27 Cal. App. 414, 150 Pac. 73 (1915) ; Stanton v. Helm,
87 Miss. 287, 39 So. 457 (1905); McMichael v. Pegram, 225 N. C. 400, 35 S. E.
2d 174 (1945).
" Wingler v. Miller, 223 N. C. 15, 25 S. E. 2d 160 (1943) ; Gage v. Phillips,
21 Nev. 150, 26 Pac. 60 (1891). Contra: Turner v. Huggins, 130 Tenn. 181, 169
S. W. 754 (1914).
"' "If marriage is not a personal transaction between the contracting parties,
what is it?" Hopkins v. Bowers, 111 N. C. 175, 179, 16 S. E. 1, 2 (1892). See
also: Smith v. Smith, 187 Ga. 743, 2 S. E. 2d 417 (1939) ; Catlett v. Chestnut, 107
Fla. 498, 146 So. 241 (1933); Berger v. Kirby, 105 Tex. 611, 153 S. W. 1130
(1913).
21 Hoag v. Wright, 174 N. Y. 36, 66 N. E. 579 (1903) ; Lane v. Rogers, 113
N. C. 171, 18 S. E. 117 (1893).
22 Davidson v. Barden, 139 N. C. 1, 51 S. E. 779 (1905) ; Gray v. Cooper, 65 N. C.
183 (1871) ; Pancoast v. Eldridge, 157 Okla. 195, 11 P. 2d 918 (1932). Contra:
Will of Fuller, 190 Wis. 445, 209 N. W. 683 (1926).
" Leavea v. Southern Ry., 266 Mo. 151, 181 S. W. 7, Annot. 1916D L. R. A.
810 (1915) ; Boyd v. Williams, 207 N. C. 30, 175 S. E. 832 (1934), commented on
in Note, 13 N. C. L. REv. 230 (1934). Contra: Warfield Natural Gas Co. v.
Clark, 257 Ky. 724, 79 S. W. 2d 21 (1934).
24 Chapman v. Bruton, Inc., 325 Ili. App. 324, 60 N. E. 2d 125 (1945) ; Wells v.
Wildin, 224 Iowa 913, 277 N. W. 308 (1938) ; -Fick v. Herman, 159 Neb. 758, 68
N. W. 2d 622 (1955); Boyd v. Williams, 207 N. C. 30, 175 S. E. 832 (1934);
Strode v. Dyer, 115 W. Va. 733. 177 S. E. 878 (1935); Waters v. Markham,
204 Wis. 332, 235 N. W. 797 (1937). Contra: Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751,
102 S. W. 2d 552 (1937) ; Kinsella v. Meyer's Adm'r, 267 Ky. 508, 102 S. W. 2d
974 (1937); Rost v. Kessler, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 97 (1944). But see: Kilmer v.
Gustason, 211 F. 2d 781 (5th Cir. 1954) (Plaintiff permitted to testify only to his
om actions and movements of his own car.
2" Barnett v. Brand, 165 Ky. 616, 177 S. W. 461 (1915).
20 Southern v. Belleau, 203 Ky. 508, 262 S. W. 619 (1924); Maciejczak v.
Bartell, 187 Wash. 113, 60 P. 2d 31 (1936).
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It is apparent that any sort of action in which the deceased and the
witness are involved can be called a "personal transaction" if the court
so desires. At best, the distinction between what the court will hold
to be a "personal transaction" in one situation and what it will hold not
to be a "personal transaction" in another situation is very fine- and
ordinarily the scales of justice are balanced very heavily toward the pro-
tection of the deceased, thus causing the doubtful case to be resolved
against the surviving party.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in the principal case, held that
the act of the plaintiff in chasing the deceased, knocking out his car
windows (with the deceased in the car with the doors locked), and
hitting the deceased in the head with a hatchet was "an independent act."
The court cited the cases of Boyd v. WilliaMs2 7 and Davis v. Pearson28
and held that both cases were inapplicable. "It would seem that the
ruling in these two cases was based on the fact that each plaintiff was a
passenger in the car."' The essence of the facts in these cases was
that the plaintiff was riding in a car with the deceased, and there was
an accident in which the plaintiff was injured. In both cases testimony
of the plaintiffs was ruled incompetent on the ground that it involved a
personal transaction with a deceased person under G. S. § 8-51. The
plaintiffs in these cases were not even allowed to testify that the de-
ceaseds were driving at the time of the accident or to testify as to any
facts that might indicate that they themselves were not driving.
The court in the principal case is obviously making a distinction
between acts done with a deceased person and acts done to such a per-
son, thereby placing an emphasis upon the "personal" relationship of the
parties. Acts done to a deceased apparently are considered "independ-
ent acts," and not within the statutory exclusion. In the automobile
cases, the testimony of the survivor relates to facts and circumstances
of which he had knowledge because of his "personal" relationship with
the deceased; while in the principal case, it could be said that there was
no "personal" relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased.
Although there is a distinction with regard to the relationship of the
parties in these cases (and thus with regard to the "personal" aspect of
the phrase "personal transaction"), there is no such logical distinction
as to the facts of each situation which constitutes the "transaction." It
would seem that neither situation involves a "transaction." In a case
involving a collision between an automobile and a truck, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas stated, "Such is not the usual, common, or ordinarily
accepted meaning of the word 'transaction.' The word is defined: 'A
!!"207 N. C. 30, 175 S. E. 832 (1934).28220 N. C. 163, 16 S. E. 2d 655 (1941).
"Hardison v. Gregory, 242 N. C. 324, 329, 88 S. E. 2d 96, 99 (1955).
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business deal; an act involving buying and selling; as the transactions
on the exchange. Its synonym is negotiation.' (Webster's New Inten-
national Dictionary, Second Edition). ' '3°
It would seem that the reasoning used by the North Carolina Court
in the principal case, in view of the normally accepted understanding of
the wording used in the "dead man's statute," is not in keeping with the
better reasoned interpretation of the statute. However, the holding of
the Court is a good one in view of the modern trend toward the admissi-
bility of evidence. It would seem that this holding is in keeping with the
normally accepted understanding of the wording of the statute and that
the holdings in the previously cited automobile cases distorted the intent
of the statute.
DONALD LEON MOORE.
Flight in General: Its Effect on Procedural Rights, Constitutional
Law, and the Grand jury
The Louisiana code provides that a challenge to the array of a grand
jury must be made "before the expiration of the third judicial day of
the term for which said grand jury shall have been drawn, or before
entering upon the trial of the case if it be sooner. . . ."' In the recent
case of Poret v. LouisianaP this statute was involved. There, one of
the defendants, Poret, fled the state after the consummation of the
offense and remained outside the jurisdiction until one and one half
years after the termination of the term of the grand jury which indicted
him. At arraignment on October 27, 1952, assisted by his own counsel,
he pleaded not guilty and was granted additional time to file a motion
for severance. On November 7, 1952, after denial of his motion for
severance, he moved-for the first time-to quash the indictment be-
cause of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury. The
trial court denied the motion, after finding that defendant was a fugitive
from justice, on the ground that it was filed more than a year and a half
too late. The Supreme Courts of Louisiana 3 and of the United States
4
affirmed, the latter on three grounds. First, the court considered the
defendant as having forfeited his right to challenge by his own action in
voluntarily fleeing. Second, even after having returned to the state he
"' Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751, 753, 102 S. W. 552, 553 (1937).
'Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 92 (1955). The phrase "third judicial
day of the term" has been interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court to mean
"the third judicial day following the term." State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24, 14 So.
2d 873 (1943).
350 U. S. 91 (1955).
Poret v. State, 225 La. 1040, 74 So. 2d 207 (1954).
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91 (1955).
Agnew v. United States, 165 U. S. 36 (1896).
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